"Far water" to quench "near thirst"? TONGRENTANGCM (03613)'s fundamental resilience and a nearly 20% Baotong gap
If the company cannot achieve an effective recovery in its share price within the remaining assessment window, the current fragile setup of "early compliance" will be like "a collapsing building."
Title context: Can "far water" quench "near thirst"? TONGRENTANGCM (03613)'s fundamental resilience and a nearly 20% Baotong gap
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As the dynamic adjustment window for Stock Connect eligible securities approaches, the "Baotong" (Stock Connect eligibility retention) outlook for TONGRENTANGCM (03613) appears to be casting an increasingly heavy shadow. The latest calculation from the "Stock Connect Delisting Watch" has already included the company in the potential removal list for the next period, with the applicable removal threshold expected to be lowered to HK$5.854 billion.
The author calculates that, as of November 19, TONGRENTANGCM (total share capital of 837 million shares) had a year-to-date average daily market capitalization of HK$5.909 billion, barely above the red line with a thin margin of approximately HK$55 million, constituting a safety cushion. However, the thickness of this buffer has already formed a significant divergence from the current share price. Calculating in reverse based on the remaining trading days, for the full-year average daily market capitalization to hold above the threshold, the share price would need to consistently trade above HK$6.44, while the closing price on November 19 was only HK$5.425. The gap of more than HK$1 between the two means the existing safety cushion could easily be breached by further price retracement.
It can thus be inferred that if the company cannot achieve an effective share price recovery within the remaining assessment window, the current fragile setup of "early compliance" will be like "a collapsing building."
A HK$0.55 safety cushion?
From the beginning of November to the 19th, looking at market activity, the interval total volume was 14.211 million shares, of which bearish volume reached as high as 10.739 million shares (accounting for over 75%), while bullish volume was only 3.472 million shares, with selling pressure showing an overwhelming advantage. In addition, the interval turnover rate was only 1.697%within a pool of 837 million total shares, average daily trading volume was only at the million-share level. This extremely low liquidity means the order book is very light; if the main force wanted to push the market capitalization upward, it would require enormous capital to sweep up shares; and once an institution throws out shares due to failed "Baotong" expectations, even a sell order at the million-share level would directly smash through the "safety cushion."
Specifically, from November 2 to November 11, trading volume remained between 498,000 and 1.586 million shares. The share price held firm in a narrow range between HK$5.625 and HK$5.775. This is a typical low-cost stabilization strategy by the main force. The main force knows full well that pulling the market capitalization up to the threshold line (requiring the share price above HK$6.44) would require an extremely large amount of capital. Therefore, the main force chose to maintain a false impression of "not falling" above HK$5.6 through minimal chip wash trading or passive absorption, attempting to stall for time and bet on a loosening of the policy window. But the extremely low "bullish volume" indicates that the bulls have no willingness to attack at all and simply do not want to actively push up the market capitalization.
On November 12, a record interval volume of 1.697 million shares erupted, and the share price directly broke below the previous platform, plunging to HK$5.485. The price decline and volume that day marked the turning point for all of November. In a market condition with extremely low turnover, a sudden sell order exceeding 1.5 million shares was by no means merely retail behavior.
From November 13 to November 19, the share price drifted steadily lower. On November 17 (1.399 million shares, closing at HK$5.490) and November 18 (1.644 million shares, closing at HK$5.430), volume-driven declines reappeared, and on November 19 the price continued to probe lower to HK$5.425, hitting a new interval low. Consecutive high-volume bearish candles indicate that holdings are accelerating their loosening. The main force capital may have completely abandoned "Baotong"not only refraining from supporting the price, but possibly using the window before the Stock Connect adjustment to conduct washout or final distribution.
It can thus be inferred that the HK$550 million safety cushion appears to exist in name only, because daily selling pressure of several million shares, on this liquidity-depleted target, is like pushing over dominoes.
Can fundamentals quench the "thirst" of Baotong?
Although TONGRENTANGCM's long-term moat is deep, the short-term performance flaw of profit growth without revenue growth is fairly significant. This also explains why TONGRENTANGCM cannot serve as a "booster" for Baotong around HK$5.
Financial reports show that in the 2026 interim period, the company achieved revenue of approximately HK$602 million, a year-on-year decrease of 21%; profit attributable to owners of the company was approximately HK$198 million, a year-on-year decrease of 15.6%. The announcement stated that the gross profit margin rose from 60.8% in the same period last year to 63.9% in the current period, a year-on-year increase of 3.1 percentage points, while the decline in profit was smaller than the decline in revenue, indicating that the company's efforts in cost and expense control and product mix optimization continued to take effect.
The product sales segment, which is the absolute core foundation, recorded HK$578.6 million, a sharp year-on-year drop of 21.79%, making it the absolute main drag on overall revenue. This data precisely confirms earlier market speculation about its reduction of wholesale shipments and squeezing of channel inventory. Against the backdrop of extremely low turnover, the company voluntarily halted extensive wholesale of high-gross-margin blockbuster products in Hong Kong and the mainland, aiming to crack down on cross-regional diversion and restore the terminal price system. Although this approach led to a sharp contraction in reported revenue, combined with the earlier data showing gross margin climbing against the trend to 63.9%, it indicates that this balance-sheet contraction is high-qualitythat is, stripping out inefficient distribution portions that disrupt prices while preserving the profit thickness of core products.
In stark contrast to the cliff-like decline on the product side, service revenue recorded HK$23.255 million, a slight increase of 6.44% against the trend. In a headwind situation where the overall pie plunged by more than 20%, the service segment demonstrated strong performance defensiveness. This portion of revenue mainly comes from its self-operated terminals and traditional Chinese medicine clinics, possessing high customer stickiness and immediate cash flow attributes. Its positive growth indicates that while the company is contracting its wholesale network, the strategic fine-tuning from wholesale to retail and strengthening of terminal experience is being delivered, and the service segment at this moment serves as a valuable performance buffer. As for brand usage fee income, it dropped directly to zero from HK$69,000 in the same period last year.
Short-term performance is under pressure, but from a long-term perspective, TONGRENTANGCM's business logic remains solidthe quasi-monopoly position of Angong Niuhuang Wan (double natural). Only 5 companies nationwide are approved to use natural musk to produce Angong Niuhuang Wan, and the Beijing Tongrentang system occupies absolute dominance. This product contributes more than half of proprietary product sales and has a strong historical pricing power. This is the structural foundation for the company's gross margin remaining above 60% over the long term, and it is a moat that no short-term performance fluctuation can erode.
However, the growth ceiling of a single monopoly product is approaching. The core consumption scenarios of Angong Niuhuang Wan (stroke emergency treatment and cardiovascular and cerebrovascular maintenance) correspond to a mature stock market with already high penetration, and its incremental space is highly dependent on price increases rather than volume expansion. Against the backdrop of continuously rising raw material costs (natural musk, cow bezoar), part of the effect of price increases is being eroded by costs, which is the deep-seated reason why the gross margin has slid from the 66% level to the 61% level.
The second growth curve, Lingzhi spore powder capsules, is highly anticipated, but the competitive landscape is far less solid than that of Angong Niuhuang Wan. This product is exclusively produced by Guoyao and has indeed grown in the mainland market (2025 mainland China revenue grew 18.3%, mainly driven by Lingzhi spore powder sales), but the competitive environment it faces is not comparable to Angong's "5 approved" monopoly structure.
What truly has long-term imaginative space is the internationalization of traditional Chinese medicine. As the only overseas platform of the Beijing Tongrentang group, the company had 76 retail terminals globally as of the end of 2025 (48 overseas), Angong Niuhuang Wan has obtained a traditional medicine registration license in Cambodia, deer products have landed in New Zealand, and the Shenzhen global shopping operations center has also been signed and established.
But the pace of realizing this growth logic is the key to understanding the Baotong dilemma.
In summary, the hard constraint required for Baotong is that within the remaining assessment trading days, the share price must consistently trade above HK$6.44 to pull the full-year average daily market capitalization back above the threshold of HK$5.854 billion. The closing price on November 19 was HK$5.425, a gap of more than HK$1, corresponding to a required gain of nearly 19%. More critically, the current fundamental state itself does not support a strong short-term catalyst.
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