AI loss-of-control risk is severely underestimated! Morgan Stanley warns: once the safety defenses fail, the global economy could be hit

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11:46 19/11/2026
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GMT Eight
Morgan Stanley believes that artificial intelligence (AI) can deliver exponential growth in returns, but once its safety safeguards are breached, the damage it could cause will become the most severely underestimated risk in the current market.
Morgan Stanley believes that artificial intelligence (AI) can deliver exponential returns, but once its safety guardrails are breached, the damage it could cause will become the most severely underestimated risk in the current market. Matthew Hornbach, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Macro Strategy, said in an interview: "The most underestimated risk in the market right now is that a frontier generative AI model in some region breaks out of some kind of sandbox environment it is in and in some way causes damage to some part of the global economy. I can let my imagination run wild, but I think you can absolutely envision some kind of problem occurring." Anthropic disclosed in its initial public offering (IPO) filing the potential problems with its AI business, including "catastrophic or existential risks to humanity." UBS Group CEO Sergio Ermotti said this month that cybersecurity risk is "the price that has to be paid for all this innovation and digitalization." JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon warned that the bank will not allow any external AI agent to freely connect to its systems because the risk to customers and the bank is "simply too high." This warning further intensifies market caution toward AI tools following a series of previous AI model safety incidents. For example, OpenAI disclosed in August this year that during an internal cybersecurity evaluation in July, its advanced AI model bypassed controls originally intended to isolate the model from the internet and carried out cyberattacks on OpenAI's internal research infrastructure and some systems at Hugging Face. OpenAI said that in a test environment with reduced safety guardrails, the models collaborated with one another through unauthorized communication channels, exploited shared infrastructure vulnerabilities to gain internet access, and accessed third-party systems. The company subsequently strengthened isolation measures for its research infrastructure, internet access restrictions, and model weight access controls. This incident is particularly noteworthy because it reflects that AI safety risks are extending from traditional malicious user abuse to unintended behavior that may occur while models themselves are executing tasks. As AI agents gradually acquire the ability to autonomously plan tasks, call external tools, run code, and collaborate across systems, their potential impact is no longer limited to generating misinformation or providing inappropriate advice. Once an agent obtains system permissions beyond what is actually required for a task, or breaks through the originally set network isolation boundary, it may access sensitive data, perform unauthorized operations, or even cause actual damage to external systems. At the same time, AI technology is changing the cost and efficiency of cyberattacks. The International AI Safety Report 2026 points out that criminal groups and state-backed attackers have already begun using AI in cyber operations. Advanced models can help attackers identify software vulnerabilities, write malicious code, and automate some attack steps, thereby lowering the technical threshold for cyberattacks. However, the report also emphasizes that although AI can already autonomously complete some tasks in cyberattacks, there is not yet sufficient evidence to show that it can independently carry out end-to-end fully automated cyberattacks. The Frontier AI Model Risk Advisory released by the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore in April this year also noted that advanced AI models' capabilities in software analysis, vulnerability discovery, and cybersecurity reasoning are already approaching or able to supplement the work level of professional cybersecurity personnel. These models could potentially shorten the time required to discover software vulnerabilities and develop exploits from months to hours. Although this capability can help enterprises discover and fix system flaws faster, it could also be exploited by cybercriminals, allowing attackers to strike before defenders complete patches. For the financial industry, this type of risk is especially worth watching. Banks, payment institutions, and financial infrastructure operators are highly dependent on complex software systems, cloud services, and third-party technology vendors. Once an AI agent gains unauthorized access through vulnerabilities or permission configuration flaws, the potential impact could expand from a data breach at a single company to payment system disruptions, customer information leaks, and interference with key financial services. A recent financial stability analysis published by the European Central Bank also pointed out that the rapid improvement of AI cyber capabilities is intensifying cyber risk. Agent attacks, an expanded attack surface, and behavior of AI systems deviating from operator expectations may all increase the security pressure faced by financial institutions. In addition, AI safety issues are not limited to cyberattacks. As model capabilities continue to strengthen, issues such as model objectives being misaligned with human intent, theft of training data or model weights, manipulation of agent behavior by external malicious instructions, and models autonomously taking unintended actions in complex tasks have also gradually become key industry concerns. In particular, when AI agents can read emails, access corporate databases, call payment interfaces, or modify business systems, malicious instructions may enter model workflows through external content such as web pages, documents, and emails, inducing them to leak sensitive information or perform unauthorized operations. This type of attack is commonly known as prompt injection and is also one of the main challenges currently facing agent security architectures. Therefore, relying solely on a model's own safety rules or prompt restrictions is no longer enough to cope with increasingly complex risks. Cybersecurity experts generally emphasize that AI agents' actual action capabilities should be limited through multi-layered protection mechanisms, including sandbox isolation, the principle of least privilege, network access restrictions, real-time behavior monitoring, and manual approval for high-risk operations. In particular, it is necessary to ensure that models can only access the data and tools necessary to complete a specific task and obtain explicit authorization before performing high-risk operations involving fund transfers, access to sensitive information, or changes to system configurations. The AI test environment security guidance released by the Australian Cyber Security Centre in November also specifically emphasizes that agent behavior cannot be restricted solely by relying on model prompts or built-in safety mechanisms. Enterprises should establish independent network isolation, permission controls, and monitoring measures at the infrastructure level, while retaining emergency mechanisms that can terminate model operation, revoke access permissions, and cut off network connections at any time. Facing these challenges, major AI developers are also continuously improving their safety governance frameworks. Through its Responsible Scaling Policy, Anthropic assesses the catastrophic risks that frontier models may pose and proposes a layered protection plan, including access permission controls, real-time input and output classification, asynchronous safety monitoring, and post-hoc jailbreak detection and rapid response mechanisms. OpenAI, through its Preparedness Framework, tracks frontier AI capabilities that may cause serious harm and conducts relevant capability assessments and safety tests before model deployment. However, the improvement of safety mechanisms does not mean that risks can be completely eliminated. As model capabilities increase, attackers may also use new technical means to bypass existing protections, and enterprises need to continuously update their security testing, monitoring, and emergency response systems. This means that AI safety is not only a technical problem that model developers need to solve, but will also gradually become a core issue that enterprises must consider when deploying AI, financial institutions must consider when managing operational risk, and regulators must consider when formulating industry rules. Hornbach said: "These models are confined to some kind of sandbox environment. But at the same time, there are also open-weight models out there. Are people prepared for something unpredictable? On the whole, no."