Carney Courts Global Capital as Canada Seeks Economic Diversification Without Abandoning the US
Prime Minister Mark Carney used Canada’s first major investment summit to present the country as a relatively stable destination for long-term capital at a time of rising geopolitical and trade uncertainty. The Toronto gathering brought together investors from nearly 30 countries responsible for more than C$100 trillion in assets, including major pension funds, European financial institutions, Gulf investment agencies, U.S. investors and China Investment Corporation. Carney’s central objective is ambitious: to catalyse C$1 trillion in new investment in Canada over the next five years. His pitch rests on a combination of abundant energy, critical minerals, technology expertise, an educated workforce, established financial institutions and preferential access to overseas markets. Ottawa is also promising tax incentives, regulatory reforms and faster project approvals to address longstanding complaints that major infrastructure and resource projects in Canada take too long to reach construction.
The summit produced substantial headline commitments. The Canadian government said agreements and initiatives associated with the event could catalyse nearly C$500 billion in investment, including close to C$100 billion of additional commitments from major Canadian institutional investors. CPP Investments and Brookfield Asset Management announced a C$50 billion Maple Fund targeting critical infrastructure and strategic industries, while PSP Investments plans to increase its Canadian holdings by C$25 billion. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan committed another C$10 billion to Canadian opportunities through the end of 2027, and Sun Life plans C$5 billion of investment in infrastructure, digital technology, energy and transportation over five years. Carney is attempting to use this domestic institutional capital as an anchor that can attract additional international funding, effectively reducing perceived project risk for foreign investors while creating deeper pools of financing for Canadian infrastructure and industry.
Energy and natural resources sit at the centre of the strategy, particularly because they offer Canada a route toward greater trade diversification. Ottawa is advancing large energy corridors, mining developments, ports, electricity infrastructure and digital projects through its new Major Projects Office, with 27 initiatives representing roughly C$500 billion in potential private investment already referred to the agency. Carney has also discussed a potential pipeline capable of carrying at least one million barrels per day of lower-emission Alberta crude to the Pacific coast for export to Asian customers, alongside plans to expand carbon capture infrastructure. Canada additionally aims to raise liquefied natural gas exports to around 50 million tonnes annually by 2030 before expanding further. The recent decision by the Shell-led LNG Canada consortium, which also includes PetroChina, Petronas, Mitsubishi and Korea Gas Corporation, to back a major second-phase expansion demonstrates how Asian energy demand can translate into large-scale Canadian investment. For Ottawa, such projects have both a commercial and strategic purpose: they create alternative destinations for Canadian resources that have historically flowed overwhelmingly south to the United States.
China consequently has a meaningful place in Canada’s diversification effort, although Ottawa is not presenting Beijing as a substitute for Washington. The attendance of China Investment Corporation at the Toronto summit reflects Canada’s willingness to engage large pools of Chinese capital alongside investors from other regions. Trade data also show some diversification already taking place. Canadian merchandise exports to countries other than the United States increased 17.2% in 2025, and total merchandise trade with non-U.S. partners rose 14.3% to C$553 billion. China remains far smaller than the United States as a Canadian export destination, but Canadian exports to China reached about C$3.8 billion in June 2026, roughly 41% higher than a year earlier. Energy, agriculture and critical resources offer obvious areas for further commercial engagement, particularly as China seeks diversified supplies of commodities and Canada seeks additional buyers. At the same time, any major increase in Canada-China investment will remain influenced by national-security reviews, strategic competition in sensitive technologies and Ottawa’s need to manage its broader North American relationships.
The United States therefore remains the constraint around which Canada’s diversification strategy must be designed. Despite the deterioration in trade relations, 71.7% of Canadian merchandise exports still went to the United States in 2025, down from 75.9% a year earlier. U.S. investors also held approximately C$737 billion of direct investment in Canada at the end of 2025, representing 46.1% of the country’s total inward foreign direct investment stock. Manufacturing, automotive production, energy, agriculture and transportation supply chains are deeply integrated across the border, making rapid economic separation unrealistic and potentially costly. The challenge for Carney is therefore not to replace one dominant economic partner with another, but to reduce concentration risk by adding more investment, customers and financing relationships in Europe, Asia and the Gulf while preserving access to the enormous U.S. market.
That distinction is central to understanding Carney’s investment strategy. Canada is attempting to convert geopolitical uncertainty into an argument for international investors to view the country as a stable supplier of energy, minerals, technology and infrastructure assets. The strategy could also create opportunities for Chinese and other Asian investors seeking exposure to commodities, clean energy infrastructure and long-duration projects outside their home markets. But the success of the plan will ultimately depend on execution. Announced commitments must turn into actual construction and capital expenditure, regulatory reforms must materially shorten project timelines, and new export infrastructure must make non-U.S. markets economically competitive rather than merely politically desirable. If those pieces come together, Canada could emerge with a more geographically balanced investment and trade structure. If they do not, the sheer scale of its existing integration with the United States will continue to dominate the country’s economic choices.











