Four super tankers break through the Strait of Hormuz, giving the oil market a temporary respite in supply shortages, with the "Strait premium" feared to become a new normal in the future.
In recent days, there has been a resurgence in the number of super oil tankers carrying non-sanctioned oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz. This provides a glimmer of limited respite for the oil market, which has been impacted by the "largest supply disruption in history."
In recent days, an increasing number of super oil tankers transporting non-sanctioned oil through the Strait of Hormuz have provided some relief to the oil market, which is suffering from the largest supply disruption in history.
According to ship tracking data, since May 10th, four oil tankers each carrying 2 million barrels (mostly Iraqi crude oil) have left the strait at a speed close to 2 million barrels per day. However, before the outbreak of war, around 20 various sizes of oil tankers passed through the waterway daily.
Oil traders are closely monitoring the flow through the Strait of Hormuz, as the blockade has led to a reduction of about 1 billion barrels in global supply. While shipments from countries other than Iran have increased, shipments from the Islamic Republic have significantly decreased since the US implemented sanctions.
Since the war began in late February, the Strait of Hormuz has been essentially closed and has since been caught in an international diplomatic "tug-of-war".
Passage through the Strait of Hormuz
Earlier this month, Iran introduced a new process for ships wishing to navigate through the Strait of Hormuz, involving coordination with an entity called the "Persian Gulf Strait Management Bureau". Meanwhile, the US maintains a blockade against Iranian ports on the edge of the Gulf of Oman.
Although some ships have been allowed to pass due to agreements between governments, this has slowed down various maritime traffic in the region. While a few oil tankers have successfully "broken through", it is unclear if these tankers are willing to return considering the risks of navigation.
In recent weeks, some commercial ships have crossed with closed satellite signals, meaning that as these vessels reappear in regions far from the Middle East, relevant data may increase in the future. In the past seven days, a total of 38 ships of various types (not just oil tankers) have crossed the Strait of Hormuz in both directions, triple the amount from the week ending on May 9th. Most of these ships did not send signals during their voyage before reaching the Gulf of Oman.
"The numbers have increased, but at such a low level that they will not have a significant impact," said Georgios Sakellariou, freight analyst at Signal Maritime. "The main issue is that even if all the tankers inside have left, new tankers will not enter in the short term."
Ship tracking data shows that of the four super oil tankers that set off with open signals, three loaded crude oil from Iraq. The fourth tanker carried goods from the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.
On Thursday, Iran stated that Chinese ships are now allowed through the Strait of Hormuz after discussions with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Just a day prior, the "Yuanhua Hu" super oil tanker became the third Chinese Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) to cross the waterway.
Similar trends have been seen in other markets, as a series of Very Large Gas Carriers (VLGC) have also increased the number of times they pass through the channel.
Due to some ships turning off their satellite transponders during passage, tracking the number of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz has become very complex. Last month, a source from the commodity trading company Mercuria Energy Group stated they had a way to let ships leave the waterway but refused to provide detailed information on the specific method.
Informants revealed last week that Middle Eastern oil companies, including Saudi Aramco Trading Company and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company owned by the United Arab Emirates, have also delivered oil goods through the waterway since its closure.
Strait of Hormuz enters the "toll era": The logic of energy pricing has been permanently rewritten
The future of passage through the Strait of Hormuz is becoming the most complex pricing variable in the global commodity market. Since the outbreak of war at the end of February, this waterway, which handles about one-third of global oil trade by sea, has evolved from a clear energy artery to a controlled gray channel. Data showing four super oil tankers leaving with Iraqi crude oil and 38 various ships making a two-way passage in seven days have been interpreted by the market as a "sign of improvement", but beneath the surface, a fundamental restructuring of the passage mechanism is reshaping the underlying logic of pricing commodities.
From "Free Passage" to "License Politics"
The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz presents a clear hierarchical pattern. The "Persian Gulf Strait Management Bureau" established by Iran this month attempts to bring the right of passage into a sovereign administrative framework, with ships required to undergo registration procedures. Meanwhile, the US blockade from the edge of the Gulf of Oman imposes targeted interceptions on Iranian ports. While neither side has completely closed the waterway, they have collectively created a fuzzy zone of "conditional passage".
This ambiguity is more disruptive to the market than a complete blockade. A full blockade would trigger clear international intervention or extensive construction of alternative routes, while the state of "partial passage, selective release" means traders cannot establish stable models of expectations. Chinese tankers receiving special permits, Iraqi crude oil flowing out with priority, and some commercial ships sneaking through by closing AIS signals - these case-by-case passage arrangements imply that passage through the strait has shifted from a "right" based on international maritime law to a "privilege" based on diplomatic maneuvering.
The warning from Signal Maritime analysts reveals the essence of this dilemma: even if existing ships are allowed to leave, new ships are unwilling to enter due to the unquantifiable risks, causing the "credit capital" of the strait to continue depreciating.
A more profound effect is the alienation of passage techniques. Closing satellite responders, falsifying navigation tracks, and ship-to-ship transfer (STS) to avoid tracking are grey operations that are transitioning from exceptions to norms. When the market cannot grasp the true flow through open data, the information black box itself becomes the biggest source of risk.
From Supply-Demand Premium to "Strait Premium"
In traditional commodity pricing models, geopolitical risks are usually added as a "risk premium" on top of supply-demand fundamentals, which are temporary and reversible. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is transforming this premium into a structural, long-term "Strait Premium", embedded in the underlying pricing system.
The first layer is the redefinition of logistics costs. Pre-war passage through the Strait of Hormuz was taken for granted as a zero marginal cost infrastructural service, but today every barrel of oil crossing the strait must bear multiple additional costs: skyrocketing war insurance rates, high rents for shadow fleets, compliance costs after closing AIS, and holding redundant inventory costs to respond to sudden blockades. These costs will not disappear when the strait reopens - once the supply chain is forced to establish redundant capabilities for detouring the Cape of Good Hope or land pipelines, fixed costs will permanently settle.
The second layer is the dual differentiation of quality-risk. The current market has shown a price difference between "passable crude oil" and "trapped crude oil". Iraqi, UAE, and Kuwaiti crude oil maintain a liquidity premium due to relative priority passage rights, while Iranian crude oil is in a discount crisis due to US sanctions. This differentiation goes beyond traditional quality differentials (such as API gravity and sulfur content) and is purely determined by geopolitical liquidity. This distortion is distorting purchasing decisions for Asian refineries: even if Iranian crude oil has a price advantage, buyers must weigh uncertainties in voyage times and risks of insurance denial, ultimately paying a higher "certainty premium" to purchase passable sources.
The third layer is the paradigm shift of the forward curve. Traditional oil futures' forward structure is based on the assumption of "frictionless trade", while in the new normal, the market must price for "shipping visibility" and "political predictability".
The Strait of Hormuz is transforming from a geographical concept to a pricing concept. The commodity market is experiencing a historical shift from a globalization pricing model prioritizing efficiency to a fragmented pricing model prioritizing security. When the weekly passage of 38 ships is enough to be called a "relief", the benchmark of the market has already shifted downward. The future prices of crude oil, natural gas, and even chemical products will increasingly reflect a logistics reality defined by a politically divided strait - this is not just a temporary risk premium, but the permanent era of "Strait Premium".
Related Articles

AI wave boosts Japan's "money king"! Kamen Rider's quarterly profits surpass Toyota's, plans to issue ADR to expand overseas market.

Is inflation completely out of control? US bond yields and the US dollar surge together, causing precious metals to suffer a "double kill": gold falls by 2%, while silver plummets by over 6%.

Public Consultation on the Measures for the Management of Seriously Untrustworthy Entities in the field of People's Bank of China
AI wave boosts Japan's "money king"! Kamen Rider's quarterly profits surpass Toyota's, plans to issue ADR to expand overseas market.

Is inflation completely out of control? US bond yields and the US dollar surge together, causing precious metals to suffer a "double kill": gold falls by 2%, while silver plummets by over 6%.

Public Consultation on the Measures for the Management of Seriously Untrustworthy Entities in the field of People's Bank of China






